Interesting connection has been established between two apparently unrelated concepts, namely, quantum nonlocality and Bayesian game theory. It has been shown that nonlocal correlations in the form of advice can outperform classical equilibrium strategies in common interest Bayesian games and also in conflicting interest games. However, classical equilibrium strategies can be of two types, fair and unfair. Whereas in fair equilibrium payoffs of different players are same, in unfair case they differ. Advantage of nonlocal correlation has been demonstrated over fair strategies. In this work we show that quantum strategies can outperform even the unfair classical equilibrium strategies. For this purpose we consider a class of two players games which as a special case includes the conflicting game proposed in [Phys. Rev. Lett. 114, 020401 (2015)]. These games can have both fair and unfair classical equilibria and also can have only unfair ones. We provide a simple analytic characterization of the nonlocal correlations that are advantageous over the classical equilibrium strategies in these games.
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Undoubtedly one of the most fundamental contradictions of Quantum mechanics (QM) with classical physics gets manifested in its nonlocal behavior. This bizarre feature of QM was first established in the seminal work of J. S. Bell [1] , where he has shown that QM is incompatible with the local-realistic world view of classical physics. More precisely, Bell showed that measurement statistics of multipartite entangled quantum systems can violate an empirically testable local realistic inequality (in general called Bell type inequalities) which establishes the denial of local realism underlying QM. Since Bell's work, nonlocality remains at the center of quantum foundational research (see [2] and references therein) and it has been verified in numerous successful experiments, starting from the famous Aspect's experiment [3] to very recent loop-hole free tests [4] . Apart from foundational interest quantum nonlocal correlations have been proved to be the key resource in various device-independent protocols [5] . Very recently Brunner and Linden have established that Bell nonlocality has interesting connection with a seemingly different area of research, namely, theory of Bayesian game [6] . A Bayesian game can be played under classical equilibrium strategies which are of two types, fair equilibria and unfair equilibria. Whereas in fair equilibria payoffs of different parties are same, in unfair equilibria they differ. It has been shown that QM can provide advantageous strategies over the best classical strategies in common interest Bayesian games [6] and can also outperform the fair classical equilibrium strategies in conflicting games [7] . The aim of this present paper is to study whether nonlocal correlation can be advantageous over the classical unfair equilibrium strategies in such a games.
Operationally Bell type inequalities can be best understood in terms of games involving several number of spatially separated parties. Each party receives some inputs and produces some outputs. No communication is allowed among the parties during the game but, they can share correlations. The aim is to cooperatively optimize some payoff function. If the correlation shared among them is classical one (or more precisely to say local realistic one) then the payoff is upper bounded by some threshold value. However it may be possible that using correlation of entangled quantum states these optimal classical bounds can be superseded, which establishes nonlocal behavior of the shared entangled state. The canonical example of such game is Clauser-HorneShimony-Holt (CHSH) game [8] involving two parties, say Alice and Bob, each with binary inputs and binary outputs. Whereas payoff of this game in local realistic theory is upper bounded by 3/4, in quantum theory one can achieve it up to 1/2(1 + 1/ √ 2). Game theoretic formulation of Bell type inequalities prompted Brunner et al. to explore the connection between Bell nonlocality and Bayesian game theory [6] . The theory of Bayesian game was discovered by Harsanyi and the framework is developed for games with incomplete information [9] (see also [10] ). In such a game, each player may have some private information unknown to other players; on the other hand the players may have a common piece of advice and thus can follow correlated strategies, giving rise to the concept of correlated Nash equilibrium [11] . As pointed out in [6] , the concept of private information in Bayesian games is analogous to the notion of locality in Bell inequalities (BI). And the fact that common advice in Bayesian games does not reveal the private information mimics the concept of no-signaling resources in case of BI. A larger class of such no-signaling correlations, proven to be stronger resource than local realistic correlations in nonlocal games, are available in QM. Naturally the question arises whether such nonlocal quantum correlations indeed provide advantage in Bayesian games over the classical strategies. Interestingly, in their paper Brunner et al. have answered affirmatively to this question [6] . The CHSH game as well as GHZ game [12] , Mermin game [13] , Magic Square Game [14, 15] , Hidden Matching game [16, 17] and the three games of [6] are all example of common interest games where the involving parties have to optimize some payoff, cooperatively. On the other hand in conflicting interest game interests of the players differ, resulting to conflict in their best actions. Battle of Sexes (BoS) is a classic example of such conflicting interest game. Interestingly in [7] , the authors have provided an example of a conflicting game where quantum strategies can outperform the classical fair equilibrium strategies. Furthermore, using semidefinite programming (SDP) they have shown that Bell states along with suitably chosen measurements are the quantum equilibrium strategies for the said game. Using the initials of the authors let call this PKLSZDK game.
A Baysian game can have only fair equilibria, both fair and unfair equilibria or only unfair equilibria. In this present paper we address the question whether quantum advice can surpass the classical unfair equilibrium strategies in such games. Interestingly, we answer affirmatively to this questions. For this purpose we have constructed a two parametric class of two players game, each player having two types/inputs and two possible actions/outputs for each type. As a special case, the PKLSZDK game is also included in this class. For certain conditions on the parameters we show that these games can have only unfair equilibria. To show the advantages of nonlocal correlation over the classical equilibrium strategies we take a very analytic approach. First we show that in the 2 − 2 − 2 scenario (i.e. two-party, each with two measurements and each measurement with two outcomes) any no signaling correlation can be expressed in a canonical form. Using this canonical form we completely characterize the no-signaling correlations providing advantages over the classical fair and unfair strategies in these games. One interesting consequence of our analysis is that it provides a simple explanation (without using any SDP), why the said strategies of [7] are quantum fair equilibrium one.
A class of two players Bayesian games: Here we adopt the same notations used in Ref. [7] . Let Alice and Bob are two players involved in the game. Alice's and Bob's types/inputs are denoted as x A ∈ X A and x B ∈ X B , respectively. For each types they take some actions/outputs denoted as y A ∈ Y A and y B ∈ Y B and accordingly they are given payoffs/utilities denoted as u A and u B , respectively, where Table I . Utility table for the game G(κ, τ). Both κ and τ are positive.
ies are given in Table- I. In accordance with the parameter κ and τ of Table- I let us denote such a game as G(κ, τ). Whenever κ < τ, there is a conflict between Alice and Bob in choosing their actions. Note that the game G(1/2, 1) is the conflicting game studied in [7] .
In the case of correlated strategies, i.e., when the parties are given some common advice, the average payoff is calculated as:
(
Here P(x) is the probability distribution over the Alice's and Bob's joint type x ≡ (x A , x B ) which is considered to be uniform for this particular game and P(y|x) denote the conditional joint action y ≡ (y A , y B ) given the type x, i.e., the probability that Alice takes action y A and Bob takes action y B given their joint type (x A , x B ). In the case of such correlated strategies, Aumann introduced the concept of correlated equilibria (CE) [11] , which have several nice properties: they are easier to find [18] , every Nash equilibrium is a CE and convex combinations of CE are again CE. For playing the game G(κ, τ) each of Alice and Bob can take one of the following four pure classical strategies:
where g 1 i (x i ) = 0 means that i th party takes the action 0 whatever be the type is and similarly the other cases; ⊕ denotes modulo 2 sum. For 16 possible pure strategies of Alice and Bob (together) their average payoffs (F A , F B ) are listed in Table- Alice's. Note that in these cases even no fair correlated equilibrium strategy is possible. The cases where κ + τ = 1.5 give a fair equilibria strategy as occurred in the conflicting game of [7] . When κ > τ it turns out to be a game with only one equilibrium; for κ < 
, with λ being a local variable (also called hidden variable by the quantum foundation community), so convexity ensures that using any such advice it is not possible to overcome the equilibrium payoffs. However in quantum world there are no-signaling correlations that are not in this local realistic form (thus called nonlocal) and hence there may be a possibility to overcome the classical equilibrium payoffs.
2 − 2 − 2 no-signaling correlations: For the two-party scenario with two two-outcome measurements for each party let denote the joint probability distribution as P(ab|ij), where the outcomes a, b ∈ {+, −} and the measurement settings i, j ∈ {0, 1}. We can express the joint distribution as [19] : (2) with outcomes in the order (++, +−, −+, −−). Here m ij and n ij denote the corresponding marginal probabilities of Alice and Bob, with positivity imposing the restrictions, max{0, m ij + n ij − 1} ≤ c ij ≤ min{m ij , n ij } ∀ ij. According to no-signaling Alice's marginal outcome probability should not depend on Bob's measurement settings and vice versa, which can be expressed as m 00 = m 01 := m 0 , m 10 = m 11 := m 1 , n 00 = n 10 := n 0 , n 01 = n 11 := n 1 . The celebrated Bell-CHSH expression is given by,B = 00 + 01 + 10 − 11 , where ij := P(+ + |ij) − P(+ − |ij) − P(− + |ij) + P(− − |ij). A no-signaling probability distribution has a local realistic description if and only if it satisfies the Bell-CHSH inequality, i.e., iff |B| ≤ 2 [20] . In terms of probabilities, the Bell-CHSH expression becomes,
Collection of all such no-signaling correlations N S form a 8 dimensional polytope with 24 vertices and the facets are determined by positivity and no-signaling constraints. Collection of all classical (local realistic) correlations L and all quantum correlations Q are convex sets lying within N S. While L is again a polytope with trivial facets given by positivity and the nontrivial facets determined by Bell-CHSH inequalities, the set Q is convex but not a polytope [21] . Any correlation outside L is called nonlocal and the strict set inclusion relations L ⊂ Q ⊂ N S reflect the fact that quantum theory contains nonlocal correlations, but nonlocality of quantum theory is restricted compared to general no-signaling correlations. While B can be at most 2 √ 2 in Q [22] , in N S it can go up to 4 [23] .
Nonlocal advantage over classical strategies: In the Bayesian game described above, the two players can be commonly advised by a general no-signaling correlation. Given such an advice NS ∈ N S Alice's and Bob's average payoffs, respectively, reads:
A no-signaling nonlocal advice outperforms some classical equilibrium payoff (F
As an explicit example in the following we study the PKLSZDK game, i.e., the game G(1/2, 1). For this game it becomes that F A + F B = 3 4 1 + 1 4 B , i.e., the sum of Alice's and Bob's average payoffs in classical, quantum, and no-signaling theories can be at most 9/8, 3/4(1 + 1/ √ 2), and 3/2, respectively. (a) Fair strategy: For fair strategy the average equilibrium payoffs of Alice and Bob are identical, which gives the condition, 2(m 0 + n 0 ) + m 1 + n 1 = 3 and both Alice's and Bob's payoffs become 3/8(1 + 1/4B). Thus any no-signaling advice will be advantageous over the best fair classical strategy if,
As described in [7] , a quantum strategy is specified by the triple {ρ AB , (M 0 . Moreover the optimal Bell-CHSH violation in quantum theory, i.e., 2 √ 2 is uniquely (up to local unitary freedom) achieved by singlet state with suitably chosen measurements [24] . This implies that the singlet state with corresponding measurement settings describe a fair equilibrium strategy in quantum theory. It is noteworthy that more general no-signaling advices can outperform best quantum strategy.
(a) Unfair strategy: From Table-II note 
is an unfair (to Bob) classical equilibrium strategy with Alice's and Bob's payoffs 11/16 and 7/16, respectively for the game G(1/2, 1). So a no-signaling advice will be considered advantageous over this strategy if F A > 11/16 and F B > 7/16 or equivalently to say:
From conditions (7) and (8) it is clear that the nosignaling correlations need to be nonlocal to provide advantage over the classical unfair equilibrium strategy. If we consider the following one parameter family of no-signaling correlations:
where 0 ≤ q ≤ 1 and P R = {P P R (ab|ij)} and D = {P D (ab|ij) with, P P R (ab|ij) = 1/2 if α ⊕ β = ij and 0 otherwise, and P D (ab|ij) = 1 if α = β = 1 and 0 otherwise, then straightforward calculation gives,
establishing advantage over the unfair classical equilibrium strategy for nonzero value of q. However this example does not solve the question whether quantum theory provides advantage over the classical strategies. This is because in Ref. [25] it has been shown that in the asymptotic limit the correlation A of Eq. (9) can be distilled to maximally nonlocal P R correlation and hence quantum realization of this correlation is not possible. To find a quantum strategy better than classical unfair equilibrium strategy we first consider the singlet state as the advice. For the sharp as well as unsharp [26] measurements performed by Alice or Bob on their respective parts the marginal probabilities are completely random and hence it is not possible to fulfill the condition (7) and (8) simultaneously. Though more general two outcome POVM can give biased marginal but still they are not useful (see [27] for detail). So singlet state is no good in this purpose and similar argument applies for any bipartite state with completely mixed marginals. Naturally we then consider a pure state |ψ AB = a|00 + b|11 as the advice, with Alice's and Bob's measurement directions specified as,
, where k ∈ {0, 1} and i ∈ {A, B}. Interestingly, we find that such advice can fulfill the requirement. For example, if we take an advice with a = 0.9 and the measurement directions θ 0 At this point one can think of a stronger refinement of the equilibrium concept, known as social optimality [28] . It is a choice of strategies, one by each player, that maximizes the sum of the players' payoffs. Of course, maximization of the sum of players' payoff may not necessarily lead to the satisfaction of all the participating players. Given the advice,
1 + 4a 2 (1 − a 2 )) = 1.2266, and one can find a strategy (see [27] ) such that F * A = 0.6978 > 11 16 and F * B = 0.5288 > 7 16 . Clearly this ' * strategy is a social optimal one, while the previous two are not. It is quite mentioning that quantum strategies also outperform the other classical unfair (unfair to Alice) equilibrium strategy. The analysis remains same if a mixed entangled advice is given instead of pure one.
Discussions: Nonlocality, arguably one of the most controversial issues in quantum foundations, has acquired lots of research attention of information theorists during last two decades due to its practical usefulness in several device independent information theoretic protocols. Very recently interesting connection of this peculiar resource has been established in another very important branch of study, namely Bayesian game theory which has several applications in economics, social and polit-ical science, and psychology. Nonlocal correlations have been shown to be advantageous in common interest Bayesian games and also in conflicting games over the classical fair strategy [6, 7, 30] . In this work we have shown that such nonlocal correlations can outperform the unfair classical equilibrium strategies of such games. Moreover, quantum advices can provide unfair social optimal strategies better than the classical one. To prove this advantages we have considered a two parametric class of two players games which can have both fair and unfair classical equilibria and also only unfair equilibria, depending on the different parameters values. Although we have considered a particular class but our analysis points out the effectiveness of nonlocal advice over any classical correlation. We also completely characterize the no-signaling advices providing advantages in these game over the fair and unfair classical equilibrium strategies.
APPENDIX Singlet state is no good for unfair strategy
As we have discussed in the manuscript, a strategy will be advantageous over classical unfair equilibrium one if, a along some directionâ, is given by, (19) and blue is for (20) . Allowed values of (α, µ) satisfying condition (15) lie in the green region. Allowed values of (α, µ) satisfying both the conditions (19) and (20) lies in the yellow regions. (19) and blue is for (20) . Allowed values of (α, µ) satisfying condition (15) lie in the green region. Allowed values of (α, µ) satisfying both the conditions (19) and (20) lies in the yellow regions.
at most 3(1 + √ 2) < 8. So singlet state along with sharp or unsharp measurements is no good for the purpose.
However considering a more general two outcome qubit measurement one can get the value of K very close to 6 and hence having a possibility of satisfying the condition (11) . At the same time the setting must have satisfy the condition (12) . In the following we study these possibilities. The most general two outcome qubit measurement (POVM) alongm can be expressed as {Em(α, µ), I − Em(α, µ)} [26] , where
If Alice performs the POVM M ≡ {Em(α, µ), I − Em(α, µ)} and Bob performs the POVM N ≡ {En(α, µ), I − En(α, µ)} on their respective part of the singlet state, the joint conditional probabilities read:
The marginal probabilities are therefore,
and the expectation MN becomes,
The Bell-CHSH quantity and K are therefore,
with B S be the CHSH value for sharp measurement taking both +ve and −ve values. And the conditions (11)-(12) look:
With B S taking +ve and −ve values, respectively, the equality of the conditions (19) - (20) represent ellipses and hyperbolas. For |B S | = 2.82 2 √ 2 corresponding ellipses and hyperbolas are plotted in Fig.1 and Fig.2 , respectively.
A choice of (α, µ) will violate both the conditions (19) and (20) if it lies outside both the ellipse (hyperbolas), i.e., in the yellow region in Fig.1 (Fig.2) . However, the allowed values of (α, µ) [compatible with condition (15) ] are in the green region, which has no overlap with the yellow region. Of course there are (α, µ) outside one curve but inside other. Changing the value of B S , we find that there is no allowed (α, µ) which can fulfill both the requirements imposed by the conditions (19) and (20) .
Therefore singlet state, even with most general two outcome POVM, is not an useful advice over the unfair classical equilibrium strategy in the PKLSZDK game. Similar kind of argument is also true for any two qubit state with both the marginal states completely mixed.
General strategy with non-maximally pure entangled advice
For an arbitrary pure non-maximally entangled state |ψ AB = a|00 + b|11 and the projective measurements performed by Alice and Bob for arbitrary directions, say,
the input-output probability distribution is listed in Table. III. Also one can express the measurement directions in polar coordinate, i.e.,
Given such a strategy {|ψ AB , (M 0 
The condition for fair strategies thus reads:
(a 2 − b 2 )(q 3 + s 3 + 2(p 3 + r 3 ) = 0,
which can be satisfied by non-maximally pure entangled state (i.e. a = b) with appropriately chosen measurement settings (i.e. q 3 + s 3 + 2p 3 + 2r 3 = 0). However, here we Table III . Input-output probability distribution for projective measurements performed by Alice and Bob on the state |ψ AB = a|00 + b|11 . 2a 2 − 1 4 .
For a = 0.9, we get F A = 0.7066(> we get,F A ∼ = 0.6978, F B ∼ = 0.5288, giving a social optimal strategy. At this point please note that, not all measurement settings giving optimal B for a quantum advice will not give F A > 11 16 and F B > 
For any value of a ∈ (0, 1), F A does not satisfy the required condition (see Fig.3 ).
